Safety Cannot Begin After Something Goes Wrong

In July 2026, Australia's eSafety Commissioner published findings concerning sexual extortion across major online services.

Between 1 July and 31 December 2025, eSafety received 2,206 individual complaints involving sexual extortion.

Males accounted for 85% of complaints, with males aged 18 to 24 representing the largest affected group.

Sexual extortion occurs when someone obtains, or claims to possess, intimate images or recordings and threatens to distribute them unless the person targeted complies with demands.

Those demands may involve money, additional intimate material or sexual acts.

The responsibility belongs entirely to the offender.

But the findings also require technology platforms to examine whether their products are doing enough before abuse reaches the point of a threat.

Harm often develops in stages

Sexual extortion does not always begin with an obviously dangerous interaction.

An offender may initially appear credible, affectionate and highly interested. They can create false intimacy, introduce urgency and pressure the other person to share personal information or become sexual very quickly.

The interaction may then move between services.

eSafety warns that rapidly leaving a dating application for another messaging or social platform can expose a phone number, location, friends and wider personal network. It can also remove the person from protections available within the original dating service.

eSafety's reporting indicates that sexual extortion frequently unfolds across multiple platforms, although it can also occur entirely within one service.

No individual platform can control everything that happens elsewhere.

Each platform can still examine whether its own design makes unsafe progression unnecessarily easy.

Reporting is necessary, but reactive

Dating services need accessible reporting, blocking and support functions.

These tools help platforms investigate misconduct, stop further contact and remove accounts.

But they are usually activated after something has already happened.

A report cannot undo the disclosure of identifying information.

A block cannot recover an intimate image.

Removing one account may not prevent the same offender from returning under another identity.

Safety therefore cannot be treated solely as an incident-response function.

It also requires attention to the pathway leading to the incident.

Earlier intervention points

A safety-conscious platform should consider where it can interrupt foreseeable patterns of manipulation.

That may include:

• warning members before they disclose sensitive contact information;
• identifying repeated attempts to move conversations off-platform immediately;
• making it easy to slow or stop an interaction without confrontation;
• limiting unnecessary identity exposure during early communication;
• preserving relevant evidence when a member makes a report;
• escalating urgent reports rapidly to trained human reviewers;
• providing clear access to specialist support.

These controls cannot eliminate sexual extortion.

They can create more opportunities for suspicious behaviour to be recognised before the offender gains greater leverage.

Odasiti's approach

Odasiti is being developed around progressive interaction rather than immediate access to every communication channel.

Members initially use private profile identities and avatars. Communication capabilities become available as both people participate in the journey and mutually choose to continue.

Identity verification is required before direct private communication is unlocked.

The purpose is not to declare that every verified person is trustworthy. Verification confirms identity; it does not establish character.

The practical objective is to reduce unnecessary early exposure, make disposable identities harder to use and allow trust to develop in stages rather than being assumed from the first interaction.

No architecture can detect every deceptive person.

But platforms should still make harmful behaviour more difficult, rather than making unsafe progression effortless.

Safety should begin before the report

Sexual extortion is a deliberate crime that exploits trust, fear and technology.

People who experience it should not be blamed for having believed someone who was intentionally deceiving them.

Platforms have a corresponding responsibility to study how their services are misused and continuously improve prevention, detection and response.

A report button will always be essential.

It should not be the point at which a platform's safety strategy begins.